Threat, function and solution map
What could go wrong when a small organisation relies on one provider for its mail, files and AI assistant, what must be true to be protected, which layers answer it and how far, and how you can check.
Version 2, 10 November 2026 · proposed by AI agents, not yet reviewed
How to read it
Every box is a claim with its own source and an exact quote, checked by a program against that source before this page is built. The 12 threats are stated for any single provider, not as claims about a named company. The tools named, Microsoft 365, Copilot and Outlook, are where the map starts, because that is where most small organisations are. A threat that nothing here answers stays open, and the gap list says so.
Each claim carries a tier: verified in code (the quote is on a named line of the platform's code), documented on a product page, stated by us (our claims register or our guide), or open (no source can be quoted, because the claim is that something does not exist). Each claim also says what would show it wrong. The drawing and the outline below carry the same claims; the outline is the full reading.
This map was drafted by AI agents from our pages, our claims register and the platform's code. Until a person at My Digital Sovereignty Ltd has reviewed a claim, it is marked proposed by AI agents, not yet reviewed.
Start from your worry or your tool
Your worry
- AI agents that overstep
- An email sent by an agent nobody approved
- Messages that sound like someone you know
- Confident AI mistakes
- Unfair automated decisions no answer on this map
- A record changed after the event
- Your provider is also the only witness
- Foreign law
- A provider you cannot leave
- Locks that will not hold forever
- Leaked passwords and member details no answer on this map
- Pictures you cannot vouch for no answer on this map
Your tool
The map
Views
Each view picks out part of the map. With scripts on, the outline shows only those claims and the drawing dims the rest; with scripts off, each link goes to that view's list further down.
- By tier: Verified in code (6) · Documented on a product page (22) · Stated by us (21) · Open: no source (2)
- By layer: Village Gateway (18) · MIO° Conduct Record (7) · Email Decision Record (15) · The Village (19) · Attested Accounts (5) · Provenance (4)
- By threat: AI agents that overstep (13) · An email sent by an agent nobody approved (6) · Messages that sound like someone you know (8) · Confident AI mistakes (4) · Unfair automated decisions (3) · A record changed after the event (16) · Your provider is also the only witness (6) · Foreign law (4) · A provider you cannot leave (4) · Locks that will not hold forever (5) · Leaked passwords and member details (1) · Pictures you cannot vouch for (1)
- By tool: Microsoft 365 (38) · Copilot (29) · Outlook (26)
- Open claims only: Gaps: not built, or no answer on this map (5)
- Claims with a limit: Claims on a link that says what it does not cover (37)
- Recently changed: Changed in the latest version (10 November 2026) (51)
- Show the whole map again
Threat (cut corners) · What must be true (rounded ends) · Layer · Evidence (double edge) · Dashed edge: open, not built or no answer
Tier, printed in each box: ◆ In code · ■ On a page · ● Stated by us · ○ Open. Status of a layer: Built · Available by arrangement · Off by default · Not built.
Lines: reduces (solid) · detects (long dashes) · depends on (dash and gap) · linked (dots). Every line that reduces or detects says, in the outline, what it does not cover.
Threat, function and solution map · Version 2, 10 November 2026 · proposed by AI agents, not yet reviewed · The current version: https://mysovereignty.digital/ring-map.html
The gap list: what this map does not answer
No answer on this map (3)
Not built (2)
Partly answered, and what is left (9)
- AI agents that overstep
- A written mandate for each agent does not cover an agent nobody listed, or an action the mandate wrongly allows
- A different person approves does not cover actions an agent takes without asking first
- Permission that runs out does not cover a wrong action carried out while the permission is still valid
- Village Gateway does not cover agents that do not call the Gateway, and systems that do not check its permits
- A spending limit for each agent does not cover requests that carry no amount, which are not counted
- Stop every Gateway decision at once does not cover agent keys, which stay valid after a stop
- Permits run out does not cover a wrong action approved and carried out within the permit's life
- Checking an action against the mandate in force does not cover agents whose key is not linked to a mandate; the check is off until turned on
- MIO° Conduct Record does not cover the action itself: the register records authority and blocks nothing
- An email sent by an agent nobody approved
- A different person approves does not cover mail sent from a mailbox the agent reaches directly
- Email Decision Record does not cover mail an agent sends straight from a mailbox without proposing it; off by default
- Four eyes on an agent's email does not cover a sole owner who turns the rule off
- Sending through a Microsoft account with send-only permission does not cover mail sent from Outlook directly; the connection is off by default and set up on request
- Messages that sound like someone you know
- A different person approves does not cover a request that never reaches a gate, such as a phone call
- Village Gateway does not cover a convincing request read and acted on by a person outside the Gateway
- Check one suspicious email does not cover voice and video, and link reputation, which is shown as not checked
- Confident AI mistakes
- A different person approves does not cover an approver who does not read closely
- Email Decision Record does not cover the truth of what the email says: the approver sees it, nothing checks it
- A record changed after the event
- An independent witness does not cover a witness that can itself rewrite what it holds
- A record anyone can check offline does not cover whether the record was true when it was signed
- Hash-linked records does not cover records from before hash-linking began, removal of the newest entries, and rewriting by the key holder
- Signing keys on a separate host, held by MDSL does not cover MDSL itself, which holds the keys
- Attested Accounts does not cover whether the figures are right; quotes, expenses and time entries have no bundle yet
- Provenance does not cover whether what a party recorded is true
- Outlook add-in: seal a message and link its reply does not cover who wrote the message, or a message nobody sealed; mail written in Outlook is not gated, and what Copilot does is not seen
- Teams tab: seal a copy of pasted text does not cover who wrote the text, that it appeared in Teams, or text nobody sealed
- Seal a file: a document version sealed by its digest does not cover who wrote the file, that it was in SharePoint or OneDrive, or a version nobody sealed; a very small text file's digest can be guessed
- Your provider is also the only witness
- An independent witness does not cover what happens inside the provider's systems before it reaches the witness
- The Village does not cover the second witness is MDSL, which holds the signing keys
- An outside clock on each Gateway receipt does not cover content: the authority sees a fingerprint only
- Foreign law
- Know who owns the provider and holds the keys does not cover the move itself: knowing the answer does not take the data anywhere
- Held in New Zealand or the EU, by providers that are not US-owned does not cover data left in Microsoft 365, and dependencies outside record storage
- A provider you cannot leave
- Know who owns the provider and holds the keys does not cover the work of moving records and habits to another system
- Export a Village's shared records does not cover files and mail kept in Microsoft 365; there is no screen for the export
- Locks that will not hold forever
- A record anyone can check offline does not cover records that are not signed again under newer methods before the old ones weaken
- Know who owns the provider and holds the keys does not cover asking for a provider's plan is not the provider having one
- A second, post-quantum signature does not cover Gateway receipts, invoices, other Village writes, and encryption of stored data
The map in words
The same 51 claims and 73 links as the drawing, band by band. Every name in a link sentence goes to that claim.
-
Threats: what could go wrong (12)
-
AI agents that overstep
Threat Tier: Documented on a product page Partly answered Tools: Copilot, Microsoft 365, Outlook Proposed by AI agents, not yet reviewed
An AI agent given tools such as email, payments, calendars or files does more than anyone intended, because it was given too much authority, too many permissions or too little oversight.
- Source
- Product page /why-trust.html, at commit 90b235706c:
An AI agent given tools (email, payments, calendars, files) does more than anyone intended, because it was given too much authority, too many permissions or too little oversight.
- Why this tier
- The quote is on /why-trust.html at commit 90b235706c, a page whose claims have been corrected against the register and the code.
- What would show it wrong
- Show an agent with access to email, payments or files that cannot do more than one person intended, on any provider, without a gate outside the agent: the threat would then be overstated.
- Audit note
- Risk 6 on the risks page, which rests on the OWASP list of risks for LLM applications. Stated at provider level, not as a claim about any named product.
- Reduced by A written mandate for each agent; does not cover an agent nobody listed, or an action the mandate wrongly allows.
- Reduced by A different person approves; does not cover actions an agent takes without asking first.
- Reduced by Permission that runs out; does not cover a wrong action carried out while the permission is still valid.
- Reduced by Village Gateway; does not cover agents that do not call the Gateway, and systems that do not check its permits.
- Reduced by A spending limit for each agent; does not cover requests that carry no amount, which are not counted.
- Reduced by Stop every Gateway decision at once; does not cover agent keys, which stay valid after a stop.
- Reduced by Permits run out; does not cover a wrong action approved and carried out within the permit's life.
- Reduced by Checking an action against the mandate in force; does not cover agents whose key is not linked to a mandate; the check is off until turned on.
- Detected by MIO° Conduct Record; does not cover the action itself: the register records authority and blocks nothing.
- Linked from A Copilot connector to Village Gateway: gap: a Copilot action is not gated unless the organisation builds the call.
-
An email sent by an agent nobody approved
Threat Tier: Stated by us Partly answered Tools: Outlook, Copilot, Microsoft 365 Proposed by AI agents, not yet reviewed
An AI assistant that can reach a mailbox sends a message, with or without attachments, to someone it should not, and no person saw it before it went.
- Source
- The guide, Stepping outside the ring:
Your rules decide each email from a person or an AI agent before it goes
- Why this tier
- The quote is in our guide, Stepping outside the ring: our statement, not an outside check.
- What would show it wrong
- Find an assistant with mailbox access whose every outgoing message is seen by a person first, with nothing added: the risk would then be smaller than stated.
- Audit note
- An AI-specific case of risk 6 (AI agents that overstep), added for this map and stated by us: the guide names it through its remedy, a gate on each email from a person or an AI agent before it goes.
- Reduced by A different person approves; does not cover mail sent from a mailbox the agent reaches directly.
- Reduced by Email Decision Record; does not cover mail an agent sends straight from a mailbox without proposing it; off by default.
- Reduced by Four eyes on an agent's email; does not cover a sole owner who turns the rule off.
- Reduced by Sending through a Microsoft account with send-only permission; does not cover mail sent from Outlook directly; the connection is off by default and set up on request.
-
Messages that sound like someone you know
Threat Tier: Documented on a product page Partly answered Tools: Outlook, Microsoft 365 Proposed by AI agents, not yet reviewed
A request that copies a trusted person's voice, face or writing style asks for money, access or a change of bank details.
- Source
- Product page /why-trust.html, at commit 90b235706c:
Scams that use AI to copy a voice, a face or a writing style, so a request seems to come from someone you trust.
- Why this tier
- The quote is on /why-trust.html at commit 90b235706c, a page whose claims have been corrected against the register and the code.
- What would show it wrong
- Find a request of this kind that a layer on this map would have held or flagged. If none of them sees it, for example a phone call, the partial mark is too generous.
- Audit note
- Risk 1 on the risks page. The layers here see only what passes through a gate or a check: an email proposed through the Email Decision Record, a request made through Village Gateway, or one message uploaded to the email check.
- Reduced by A different person approves; does not cover a request that never reaches a gate, such as a phone call.
- Reduced by Village Gateway; does not cover a convincing request read and acted on by a person outside the Gateway.
- Detected by Check one suspicious email; does not cover voice and video, and link reputation, which is shown as not checked.
- Linked from Reading a Microsoft 365 mailbox through Microsoft sign-in: gap: replies to a Microsoft 365 mailbox are not recorded through Microsoft sign-in.
-
Confident AI mistakes
Threat Tier: Documented on a product page Partly answered Tools: Copilot, Outlook Proposed by AI agents, not yet reviewed
An AI assistant states something false as fluently as something true, in a summary, a draft reply or a quoted rule.
- Source
- Product page /why-trust.html, at commit 90b235706c:
An AI assistant states something false with the same fluency as something true.
- Why this tier
- The quote is on /why-trust.html at commit 90b235706c, a page whose claims have been corrected against the register and the code.
- What would show it wrong
- Show a layer on this map that checks whether what an AI wrote is true. None is claimed: the answer here is only that a person sees the exact message first.
- Audit note
- Risk 3 on the risks page. A held email is shown to its approver exactly as it would be sent; nothing on this map checks its content.
- Reduced by A different person approves; does not cover an approver who does not read closely.
- Reduced by Email Decision Record; does not cover the truth of what the email says: the approver sees it, nothing checks it.
-
Unfair automated decisions
Threat Tier: Documented on a product page No answer on this map Tools: Copilot, Microsoft 365 Proposed by AI agents, not yet reviewed
Software that sorts, ranks or screens people learns patterns from old data, and those patterns can disadvantage some groups.
- Source
- Product page /why-trust.html, at commit 90b235706c:
Software that sorts, ranks or screens people learns patterns from old data, and those patterns can disadvantage some groups.
- Why this tier
- The quote is on /why-trust.html at commit 90b235706c, a page whose claims have been corrected against the register and the code.
- What would show it wrong
- Show a layer here that reviews outcomes by group. None does: Village Gateway records which rule applied to each decision, which makes a decision readable, not fair.
- Audit note
- Risk 5 on the risks page. No layer on this map is offered as the answer: recorded reasons make a decision open to appeal, which is not a review of outcomes by group.
- Linked from Village Gateway: records which rule applied to each decision, so a decision can be read and appealed; it does not show how outcomes fall by group.
-
A record changed after the event
Threat Tier: Documented on a product page Partly answered Tools: Microsoft 365 Proposed by AI agents, not yet reviewed
A minute, invoice or decision is edited, back-dated or removed after the fact, and the copy that remains reads as though it was always so.
- Source
- Product page /attested-accounts.html, at commit 90b235706c:
so a later change to a record can be detected by you, your accountant or an auditor
- Why this tier
- The quote is on /attested-accounts.html at commit 90b235706c, a page whose claims have been corrected against the register and the code.
- What would show it wrong
- Change a signed record on this platform and present it to a checker: if the checker passes it, the detection claims attached to this threat are wrong.
- Audit note
- An AI-specific case added for this map. The source names the risk through its remedy on the Attested Accounts page.
- Reduced by An independent witness; does not cover a witness that can itself rewrite what it holds.
- Detected by A record anyone can check offline; does not cover whether the record was true when it was signed.
- Detected by Hash-linked records; does not cover records from before hash-linking began, removal of the newest entries, and rewriting by the key holder.
- Reduced by Signing keys on a separate host, held by MDSL; does not cover MDSL itself, which holds the keys.
- Detected by Attested Accounts; does not cover whether the figures are right; quotes, expenses and time entries have no bundle yet.
- Detected by Provenance; does not cover whether what a party recorded is true.
- Reduced by Outlook add-in: seal a message and link its reply; does not cover who wrote the message, or a message nobody sealed; mail written in Outlook is not gated, and what Copilot does is not seen.
- Reduced by Teams tab: seal a copy of pasted text; does not cover who wrote the text, that it appeared in Teams, or text nobody sealed.
- Reduced by Seal a file: a document version sealed by its digest; does not cover who wrote the file, that it was in SharePoint or OneDrive, or a version nobody sealed; a very small text file's digest can be guessed.
-
Your provider is also the only witness
Threat Tier: Stated by us Partly answered Tools: Microsoft 365, Copilot, Outlook Proposed by AI agents, not yet reviewed
The provider that runs the platform is also the only party able to say what happened on it, so nobody outside can check its account.
- Source
- The guide, Stepping outside the ring:
A provider can protect its own platform. It cannot also be the independent witness of what happened on it.
- Why this tier
- The quote is in our guide, Stepping outside the ring: our statement, not an outside check.
- What would show it wrong
- Find a provider whose own records of activity on its platform can be checked by an outsider without trusting that provider: the threat would then not hold for it.
- Audit note
- Our framing, from the guide. Stated at provider level; it applies to any single provider, this one included.
- Reduced by An independent witness; does not cover what happens inside the provider's systems before it reaches the witness.
- Reduced by The Village; does not cover the second witness is MDSL, which holds the signing keys.
- Reduced by An outside clock on each Gateway receipt; does not cover content: the authority sees a fingerprint only.
-
Foreign law
Threat Tier: Documented on a product page Partly answered Tools: Microsoft 365, Outlook, Copilot Proposed by AI agents, not yet reviewed
Data is held by companies, and a company answers to the law of the country that owns it, not only to the law of the country where its servers stand.
- Source
- Product page /why-trust.html, at commit 90b235706c:
Data is held by companies, and companies answer to the law of the country that owns them, not only the country where the servers stand.
- Why this tier
- The quote is on /why-trust.html at commit 90b235706c, a page whose claims have been corrected against the register and the code.
- What would show it wrong
- Show that a provider's parent company cannot be required by its home country to produce data held abroad: the threat would then be overstated for that provider.
- Audit note
- Risk 7 on the risks page, which cites the US CLOUD Act text. The map does not say how often this happens to small organisations.
- Reduced by Know who owns the provider and holds the keys; does not cover the move itself: knowing the answer does not take the data anywhere.
- Reduced by Held in New Zealand or the EU, by providers that are not US-owned; does not cover data left in Microsoft 365, and dependencies outside record storage.
-
A provider you cannot leave
Threat Tier: Stated by us Partly answered Tools: Microsoft 365, Outlook Proposed by AI agents, not yet reviewed
Records, mail and working habits sit with one provider, so leaving it, or even checking what it holds, depends on that provider.
- Source
- The guide, Stepping outside the ring:
Most small organisations put their trust in the provider they already use and may even expect it to supply protection and sovereignty.
- Why this tier
- The quote is in our guide, Stepping outside the ring: our statement, not an outside check.
- What would show it wrong
- Show that an organisation can take all its records and mail from its provider, in a form another system reads, without that provider's help: the threat would then be smaller.
- Audit note
- An AI-specific case added for this map, in our words. The quote shows the dependence; the difficulty of leaving is our inference from it.
- Reduced by Know who owns the provider and holds the keys; does not cover the work of moving records and habits to another system.
- Reduced by Export a Village's shared records; does not cover files and mail kept in Microsoft 365; there is no screen for the export.
-
Locks that will not hold forever
Threat Tier: Documented on a product page Partly answered Tools: Microsoft 365, Outlook Proposed by AI agents, not yet reviewed
Today's encryption and signatures rest on mathematics that a large enough quantum computer could undo, and records stored today could be read later.
- Source
- Product page /why-trust.html, at commit 90b235706c:
rest on mathematics that a large enough quantum computer could undo
- Why this tier
- The quote is on /why-trust.html at commit 90b235706c, a page whose claims have been corrected against the register and the code.
- What would show it wrong
- Show that the signature and encryption methods in common use will stay sound for the lifetime of a long-lived record: the threat would then be overstated.
- Audit note
- Risk 8 on the risks page, which cites NIST and the UK National Cyber Security Centre. A horizon, not an alarm.
- Reduced by A record anyone can check offline; does not cover records that are not signed again under newer methods before the old ones weaken.
- Reduced by Know who owns the provider and holds the keys; does not cover asking for a provider's plan is not the provider having one.
- Reduced by A second, post-quantum signature; does not cover Gateway receipts, invoices, other Village writes, and encryption of stored data.
-
Leaked passwords and member details
Threat Tier: Documented on a product page No answer on this map Tools: Microsoft 365, Outlook Proposed by AI agents, not yet reviewed
A breach at any service people use exposes passwords and personal details, which are then tried on other services.
- Source
- Product page /why-trust.html, at commit 90b235706c:
A security breach at any service your members use, which exposes passwords and personal details that are then tried elsewhere.
- Why this tier
- The quote is on /why-trust.html at commit 90b235706c, a page whose claims have been corrected against the register and the code.
- What would show it wrong
- Show a layer on this map that stops a leaked or reused password being used. None is claimed here, so this threat stays open.
- Audit note
- Risk 2 on the risks page. Two-step sign-in and a different password for each service are the advice there; no layer on this map is offered as the answer.
- Nothing on this map answers it.
-
Pictures you cannot vouch for
Threat Tier: Documented on a product page No answer on this map Tools: Copilot, Microsoft 365 Proposed by AI agents, not yet reviewed
Images, audio and video are generated or altered well enough that the eye cannot tell.
- Source
- Product page /why-trust.html, at commit 90b235706c:
Images, audio and video that are generated or altered well enough that the eye cannot tell.
- Why this tier
- The quote is on /why-trust.html at commit 90b235706c, a page whose claims have been corrected against the register and the code.
- What would show it wrong
- Show a layer on this map that signs a photograph or a recording when it is made. None does, so this threat stays open.
- Audit note
- Risk 4 on the risks page. Provenance signs records of goods along a supply chain, not media, so it is not drawn against this threat.
- Nothing on this map answers it.
-
-
What must be true to be protected (6)
-
A written mandate for each agent
What must be true Tier: Documented on a product page Tools: Copilot, Microsoft 365 Proposed by AI agents, not yet reviewed
Each AI agent has a written statement of what it may do, kept where it can be shown later.
- Source
- Product page /why-trust.html, at commit 90b235706c:
A careful community writes down what each agent may do
- Why this tier
- The quote is on /why-trust.html at commit 90b235706c, a page whose claims have been corrected against the register and the code.
- What would show it wrong
- Find a case where a written mandate made no difference to what could be shown afterwards about an agent's authority: the need would then be overstated.
- Audit note
- From the advice under risk 6 on the risks page. The guide's first step this week is the same list.
- Reduces AI agents that overstep; does not cover an agent nobody listed, or an action the mandate wrongly allows.
- Linked from MIO° Conduct Record: provides it: a sealed register of what each agent may do.
-
A different person approves
What must be true Tier: Documented on a product page Tools: Copilot, Outlook, Microsoft 365 Proposed by AI agents, not yet reviewed
An action with real consequences waits for a person other than the one, or the agent, that asked for it.
- Source
- Product page /why-trust.html, at commit 90b235706c:
require a person to approve high-impact actions
- Why this tier
- The quote is on /why-trust.html at commit 90b235706c, a page whose claims have been corrected against the register and the code.
- What would show it wrong
- Show that a second approver adds nothing when the first is the requester or the requester's agent: the need would then be overstated.
- Audit note
- One of the OWASP remedies quoted under risk 6 on the risks page. The word different is ours: the page says a person.
- Reduces AI agents that overstep; does not cover actions an agent takes without asking first.
- Reduces An email sent by an agent nobody approved; does not cover mail sent from a mailbox the agent reaches directly.
- Reduces Messages that sound like someone you know; does not cover a request that never reaches a gate, such as a phone call.
- Reduces Confident AI mistakes; does not cover an approver who does not read closely.
- Linked from Village Gateway: provides it: a held request waits for a different approver.
- Linked from The requester cannot approve its own request: provides it in code: the requester's approval is refused.
- Linked from Four eyes on an agent's email: provides it for email: the person who registered an agent cannot release its held email.
-
Permission that runs out
What must be true Tier: Stated by us Tools: Copilot Proposed by AI agents, not yet reviewed
Permission to act covers one action for a short time, so a stolen or replayed permission is of little use.
- Source
- The guide, Stepping outside the ring:
An allowed action gets a single-use permit that lasts at most five minutes.
- Why this tier
- The quote is in our guide, Stepping outside the ring: our statement, not an outside check.
- What would show it wrong
- Show a replayed or late permission that a protected system still accepts: the need would then be unmet by the layer that claims it.
- Audit note
- Stated by us in the guide as a property of Village Gateway; the need itself is general.
- Reduces AI agents that overstep; does not cover a wrong action carried out while the permission is still valid.
- Linked from Permits run out: provides it: a single-use permit with a time ceiling.
-
An independent witness
What must be true Tier: Stated by us Tools: Microsoft 365, Outlook, Copilot Proposed by AI agents, not yet reviewed
Someone other than the provider keeps a signed, dated record of what was done, by whom and with whose approval.
- Source
- The guide, Stepping outside the ring:
This guide adds that witness around the tools you already use
- Why this tier
- The quote is in our guide, Stepping outside the ring: our statement, not an outside check.
- What would show it wrong
- Show that a second party's record adds nothing to what the provider's own record shows: the need would then be overstated.
- Audit note
- Our framing, from the guide. The witness offered on this map is MDSL, a second provider, not a neutral third party.
- Reduces Your provider is also the only witness; does not cover what happens inside the provider's systems before it reaches the witness.
- Reduces A record changed after the event; does not cover a witness that can itself rewrite what it holds.
- Linked from The Village: provides it, from a second provider: MDSL keeps the signed record.
- Linked from An outside clock on each Gateway receipt: adds an outside clock that sees only a fingerprint.
-
A record anyone can check offline
What must be true Tier: Documented on a product page Tools: Microsoft 365, Outlook Proposed by AI agents, not yet reviewed
A record can be checked by whoever holds it, without an account and without asking the provider.
- Source
- Product page /why-trust.html, at commit 90b235706c:
prefers signatures that can be checked without the provider
- Why this tier
- The quote is on /why-trust.html at commit 90b235706c, a page whose claims have been corrected against the register and the code.
- What would show it wrong
- Show a record from one of the layers here that cannot be checked without an account or a network call to MDSL: the need would then be unmet for that layer.
- Audit note
- From the advice under risk 8 on the risks page.
- Detects A record changed after the event; does not cover whether the record was true when it was signed.
- Reduces Locks that will not hold forever; does not cover records that are not signed again under newer methods before the old ones weaken.
- Linked from Village Gateway: provides it: an exported decision checks offline.
- Linked from Email Decision Record: provides it: a dossier checks offline.
- Linked from MIO° Conduct Record: provides it: an auditor checks offline.
- Linked from Attested Accounts: provides it for invoices.
- Linked from Provenance: provides it: a buyer checks in a browser.
- Linked from Outlook add-in: seal a message and link its reply: provides it for a sealed message: its record checks offline.
- Linked from Teams tab: seal a copy of pasted text: provides it for pasted text: the saved copy checks against its record.
- Linked from Seal a file: a document version sealed by its digest: provides it for a file: any copy of the same version checks against its record.
- Linked from What a check cannot show: the limit of every check: unchanged since signing, not true.
-
Know who owns the provider and holds the keys
What must be true Tier: Documented on a product page Tools: Microsoft 365, Outlook, Copilot Proposed by AI agents, not yet reviewed
Before relying on a provider, an organisation knows who owns it, which laws reach it and who holds the keys.
- Source
- Product page /why-trust.html, at commit 90b235706c:
A careful community asks a provider who owns the company, which laws reach it, and who holds the keys.
- Why this tier
- The quote is on /why-trust.html at commit 90b235706c, a page whose claims have been corrected against the register and the code.
- What would show it wrong
- Ask the question of the layers on this map: if MDSL's answer is not on its own pages, the need is unmet here too.
- Audit note
- From the advice under risk 7 on the risks page. The answer for this map's layers is on it: MDSL holds the signing keys.
- Reduces Foreign law; does not cover the move itself: knowing the answer does not take the data anywhere.
- Reduces A provider you cannot leave; does not cover the work of moving records and habits to another system.
- Reduces Locks that will not hold forever; does not cover asking for a provider's plan is not the provider having one.
- Linked from Signing keys on a separate host, held by MDSL: answers it for these layers: MDSL holds the signing keys.
- Linked from Held in New Zealand or the EU, by providers that are not US-owned: answers it for these layers: New Zealand or EU hosts, not US-owned.
-
-
Layers: what answers it, and how far (24)
-
Village Gateway
Layer Tier: Stated by us Status: Built (register GTW-01) Tools: Copilot, Microsoft 365 Proposed by AI agents, not yet reviewed
An agent or a person asks before acting; the Village's policy answers allow, hold or deny; a held request waits for a different approver; an allowed request gets a one-use permit.
- Source
- Claims register entry GTW-01:
an approval-gated request waits for a different approver, and an allowed request gets a one-use permit that a resource redeems exactly once
- Why this tier
- The quote is in our claims register, entry GTW-01: our statement, not an outside check.
- What would show it wrong
- Find a Gateway decision held for approval that was released by the requester, or a permit redeemed twice: either would show this claim wrong.
- Audit note
- Register status built. It is turned on Village by Village and governs only agents that call it and systems that check its permits. No customer has used it. The register records it as built.
- Linked to A different person approves: provides it: a held request waits for a different approver.
- Linked to A record anyone can check offline: provides it: an exported decision checks offline.
- Reduces AI agents that overstep; does not cover agents that do not call the Gateway, and systems that do not check its permits.
- Reduces Messages that sound like someone you know; does not cover a convincing request read and acted on by a person outside the Gateway.
- Linked to Unfair automated decisions: records which rule applied to each decision, so a decision can be read and appealed; it does not show how outcomes fall by group.
- Depends on The Village: switched on Village by Village.
- Checking an action against the mandate in force depends on it: runs only on requests the Gateway governs.
- Linked from The Gateway checking program: checks an exported decision.
- Its parts on this map: A Copilot connector to Village Gateway, The requester cannot approve its own request, Permits run out, Stop every Gateway decision at once, A spending limit for each agent, An outside clock on each Gateway receipt.
-
A Copilot connector to Village Gateway
Layer Tier: Open: no source Status: Not built Tools: Copilot Proposed by AI agents, not yet reviewed
No connector makes a Copilot action ask Village Gateway first, and the Village has no Copilot integration: it does not see or govern what Copilot does. A Copilot action reaches the Gateway only if something the organisation builds calls it.
- Source
- None: a gap, shown by absence.
- Why this tier
- No source can be quoted: this is a gap, shown by absence (see the audit note). Map version 2.
- What would show it wrong
- Find a Copilot plugin, declarative agent or Copilot Studio connector in the platform that calls Village Gateway: this gap would then be closed.
- Audit note
- A gap, shown by absence: a code census of the platform found no Copilot integration of any kind. The Outlook, Teams and file connectors do not change this. An adapter for a Microsoft agent framework exists in the repository but is not served or offered, so it is not claimed.
- Linked to AI agents that overstep: gap: a Copilot action is not gated unless the organisation builds the call.
- Part of Village Gateway.
-
The requester cannot approve its own request
Layer Tier: Verified in code Status: Built (register GTW-13) Tools: Copilot Proposed by AI agents, not yet reviewed
Village Gateway refuses an approval when the approver is the requester.
- Source
- Code: src/services/gateway/gatewayService.js, line 1811, at commit 90b235706c:
throw err('APPROVER_IS_REQUESTER', 'the approver may not be the requester');
- Why this tier
- The quote is on line 1811 of src/services/gateway/gatewayService.js at commit 90b235706c, checked by the validator against that commit.
- What would show it wrong
- Approve a held Gateway request while signed in as the owner of the requesting key: if it is released, the claim is wrong.
- Audit note
- The line before compares the approver with both the requesting principal and the owner of the requesting key. The register adds that agents have no approve action at all.
- Linked to A different person approves: provides it in code: the requester's approval is refused.
- Part of Village Gateway.
-
Permits run out
Layer Tier: Verified in code Status: Built (register GTW-09) Tools: Copilot Proposed by AI agents, not yet reviewed
Village Gateway refuses to issue a permit that would live longer than its ceiling of 900 seconds, fifteen minutes.
- Source
- Code: src/services/gateway/permit.js, line 67, at commit 90b235706c:
throw new GatewayError('PERMIT_TTL_TOO_LONG', `a permit may live at most ${MAX_TTL_SECONDS} seconds`)
- Why this tier
- The quote is on line 67 of src/services/gateway/permit.js at commit 90b235706c, checked by the validator against that commit.
- What would show it wrong
- Ask for a permit lasting longer than fifteen minutes: if one is issued, the claim is wrong.
- Audit note
- The ceiling is set at line 18 of the same file. The register adds that the default permit lasts five minutes and never outlasts its decision.
- Linked to Permission that runs out: provides it: a single-use permit with a time ceiling.
- Reduces AI agents that overstep; does not cover a wrong action approved and carried out within the permit's life.
- Part of Village Gateway.
-
Stop every Gateway decision at once
Layer Tier: Stated by us Status: Built (register GTW-11) Tools: Copilot Proposed by AI agents, not yet reviewed
The Village owner can stop Village Gateway in one step: outstanding permits are withdrawn and nothing is decided until the stop is lifted.
- Source
- Claims register entry GTW-11:
The Village owner can stop Village Gateway in one step: outstanding permits are withdrawn, and nothing is decided, approved or redeemed until the owner lifts the stop.
- Why this tier
- The quote is in our claims register, entry GTW-11: our statement, not an outside check.
- What would show it wrong
- Stop the Gateway and redeem a permit issued before the stop: if it works, the claim is wrong.
- Audit note
- Register status built. Agent keys are not revoked by the stop, and held requests keep their hold.
- Reduces AI agents that overstep; does not cover agent keys, which stay valid after a stop.
- Part of Village Gateway.
-
A spending limit for each agent
Layer Tier: Stated by us Status: Built (register GTW-12) Tools: Copilot Proposed by AI agents, not yet reviewed
The Village owner can set a spending limit on each agent key, per currency, per day, week or month; a request over the limit is refused, not held.
- Source
- Claims register entry GTW-12:
The Village owner can set a spending limit on each agent key, per currency, per day, week or month; a request over the limit is refused, not held.
- Why this tier
- The quote is in our claims register, entry GTW-12: our statement, not an outside check.
- What would show it wrong
- Make a request over an agent key's limit: if it is allowed or held, the claim is wrong.
- Audit note
- Register status built. A request with no amount is not counted against the limit.
- Reduces AI agents that overstep; does not cover requests that carry no amount, which are not counted.
- Part of Village Gateway.
-
An outside clock on each Gateway receipt
Layer Tier: Stated by us Status: Built (register GTW-07) Tools: Copilot Proposed by AI agents, not yet reviewed
Village Gateway sends every receipt it signs to an outside time-stamping authority, so the time of a decision does not rest on MDSL's clock alone.
- Source
- Claims register entry GTW-07:
Village Gateway sends every receipt it signs to an outside time-stamping authority (Certum)
- Why this tier
- The quote is in our claims register, entry GTW-07: our statement, not an outside check.
- What would show it wrong
- Export a Gateway decision after its stamp has arrived and run the checking program: if the stamp does not verify, the claim is wrong.
- Audit note
- Register status built. The stamp arrives after the receipt is signed, so an early export reads incomplete; the authority sees only a fingerprint.
- Linked to An independent witness: adds an outside clock that sees only a fingerprint.
- Reduces Your provider is also the only witness; does not cover content: the authority sees a fingerprint only.
- Part of Village Gateway.
-
MIO° Conduct Record
Layer Tier: Stated by us Status: Available by arrangement (register CON-01) Tools: Copilot, Microsoft 365 Proposed by AI agents, not yet reviewed
A sealed register of what an organisation's AI agents are authorised to do, and which agents exist; a change to a mandate is a new dated record and the old one is kept.
- Source
- Claims register entry CON-01:
MIO° Conduct Record is a sealed register of what an organisation's AI agents are authorised to do, and which agents exist.
- Why this tier
- The quote is in our claims register, entry CON-01: our statement, not an outside check.
- What would show it wrong
- Find a mandate change that replaced the earlier record instead of superseding it: the claim would then be wrong.
- Audit note
- Register status available on request. It records authority and blocks nothing itself; the mandate check sits in Village Gateway and is off until turned on.
- Linked to A written mandate for each agent: provides it: a sealed register of what each agent may do.
- Linked to A record anyone can check offline: provides it: an auditor checks offline.
- Detects AI agents that overstep; does not cover the action itself: the register records authority and blocks nothing.
- Linked from The Conduct Record offline check: checks a Conduct Record.
- Its parts on this map: Checking an action against the mandate in force.
-
Checking an action against the mandate in force
Layer Tier: Stated by us Status: Off by default (register CON-07) Tools: Copilot Proposed by AI agents, not yet reviewed
Where a policy requires a mandate, Village Gateway denies a request whose action, resource, amount or dates fall outside the agent's mandate in force.
- Source
- Claims register entry CON-07:
Village Gateway checks any request it governs, where a policy requires a mandate
- Why this tier
- The quote is in our claims register, entry CON-07: our statement, not an outside check.
- What would show it wrong
- Turn the check on and make a request outside the mandate in force: if it is allowed, the claim is wrong.
- Audit note
- Built; turned off until a Village adopts it. It acts only for agents whose key the owner has linked to a mandate; no customer has used it.
- Reduces AI agents that overstep; does not cover agents whose key is not linked to a mandate; the check is off until turned on.
- Depends on Village Gateway: runs only on requests the Gateway governs.
- Part of MIO° Conduct Record.
-
Email Decision Record
Layer Tier: Documented on a product page Status: Off by default (register EDR-03) Tools: Outlook, Microsoft 365, Copilot Proposed by AI agents, not yet reviewed
Each email a person or an AI agent proposes is decided by the owner's policy before it goes: send, hold for an approver, or refuse. It sits beside the existing mailbox and leaves a signed record.
- Source
- Product page /email-decision-record-product.html, at commit 90b235706c:
It works beside the mailbox you already use: Gmail, Microsoft 365 or any SMTP mail service. It adds a decision and a record. It does not replace your mail.
- Why this tier
- The quote is on /email-decision-record-product.html at commit 90b235706c, a page whose claims have been corrected against the register and the code.
- What would show it wrong
- Find a proposed email that went out without a decision record, or a held email released without an approver: either would show this claim wrong.
- Audit note
- Built; turned off until a Village adopts it. No customer is live. It decides only mail proposed to it; mail sent straight from a mailbox is not seen.
- Linked to A record anyone can check offline: provides it: a dossier checks offline.
- Reduces An email sent by an agent nobody approved; does not cover mail an agent sends straight from a mailbox without proposing it; off by default.
- Reduces Confident AI mistakes; does not cover the truth of what the email says: the approver sees it, nothing checks it.
- Linked from The Email Decision Record checker: checks a dossier.
- Its parts on this map: Reading a Microsoft 365 mailbox through Microsoft sign-in, Four eyes on an agent's email, Sending through a Microsoft account with send-only permission, Outlook add-in: seal a message and link its reply, Teams tab: seal a copy of pasted text, Seal a file: a document version sealed by its digest.
-
Reading a Microsoft 365 mailbox through Microsoft sign-in
Layer Tier: Open: no source Status: Not built Tools: Outlook, Microsoft 365 Proposed by AI agents, not yet reviewed
No route reads a Microsoft 365 mailbox through Microsoft sign-in, so replies are not recorded on their own. The capture reader signs in with a username and password; the Outlook add-in records a reply only when a person seals it.
- Source
- None: a gap, shown by absence.
- Why this tier
- No source can be quoted: this is a gap, shown by absence (see the audit note). Map version 2.
- What would show it wrong
- Find a capture path in the platform that reads a Microsoft 365 mailbox with Microsoft sign-in: this gap would then be closed.
- Audit note
- A gap. The code census found the capture reader uses password sign-in over IMAP only, with no Microsoft sign-in path. Whether a given Microsoft 365 mailbox accepts password sign-in is a setting on Microsoft's side and was not tested, so automatic capture from Microsoft 365 is not claimed.
- Linked to Messages that sound like someone you know: gap: replies to a Microsoft 365 mailbox are not recorded through Microsoft sign-in.
- Part of Email Decision Record.
-
Four eyes on an agent's email
Layer Tier: Documented on a product page Status: Off by default (register EDR-02) Tools: Outlook, Copilot Proposed by AI agents, not yet reviewed
By default, the person who registered an agent cannot approve that agent's held email.
- Source
- Product page /email-decision-record-product.html, at commit 90b235706c:
the person who registered an agent cannot approve that agent's held email.
- Why this tier
- The quote is on /email-decision-record-product.html at commit 90b235706c, a page whose claims have been corrected against the register and the code.
- What would show it wrong
- Release an agent's held email while signed in as the person who registered the agent, under a default policy: if it goes, the claim is wrong.
- Audit note
- Built; turned off until a Village adopts it. A sole owner can turn the rule off when adopting a policy, and a policy can require two approvers.
- Linked to A different person approves: provides it for email: the person who registered an agent cannot release its held email.
- Reduces An email sent by an agent nobody approved; does not cover a sole owner who turns the rule off.
- Part of Email Decision Record.
-
Sending through a Microsoft account with send-only permission
Layer Tier: Verified in code Status: Off by default (register EDR-05) Tools: Outlook, Microsoft 365 Proposed by AI agents, not yet reviewed
To send a released email through a connected Microsoft account, the Email Decision Record asks Microsoft for permission to send mail, not to read the mailbox.
- Source
- Code: src/services/emailDecisionRecord/mailAdapters/microsoftGraph.js, line 61, at commit 90b235706c:
const REQUESTED_SCOPE = 'Mail.Send offline_access openid email';
- Why this tier
- The quote is on line 61 of src/services/emailDecisionRecord/mailAdapters/microsoftGraph.js at commit 90b235706c, checked by the validator against that commit.
- What would show it wrong
- Connect a Microsoft account and read the permissions Microsoft shows for it: if reading mail is among them, the claim is wrong.
- Audit note
- Built; turned off until a Village adopts it. The connection is set up with the organisation on request; whether one exists on either host was not read.
- Reduces An email sent by an agent nobody approved; does not cover mail sent from Outlook directly; the connection is off by default and set up on request.
- Part of Email Decision Record.
-
Outlook add-in: seal a message and link its reply
Layer Tier: Verified in code Status: Off by default Tools: Outlook, Microsoft 365 Proposed by AI agents, not yet reviewed
Built and turned off until a Village adopts it. A person opens a message in Outlook and seals it: Outlook digests the message file and each attachment, and the Village signs digests and pseudonyms, not the message. A later reply is linked to the sealed message it answers.
- Source
- Code: src/services/emailDecisionRecord/outlookAddin.js, line 320, at commit 36283f026e:
const answered = await findAnswered(tenantId, record, receipt.receipt_id);
- Why this tier
- The quote is on line 320 of src/services/emailDecisionRecord/outlookAddin.js at commit 36283f026e, checked by the validator against that commit.
- What would show it wrong
- Seal a message, then seal a reply to it in the same Village: if the reply's seal does not name the first record, or the Village holds the message body, the claim is wrong.
- Audit note
- Built, turned off, not yet tried in a real Microsoft 365 account: EDR_OUTLOOK_ADDIN_ENABLED is not set. Tested in tests/integration/emailDecisionRecordOutlookAddin.test.js. It seals mail a person opens; it does not gate mail written in Outlook and does not see what Copilot does. No claims register entry of its own yet.
- Linked to A record anyone can check offline: provides it for a sealed message: its record checks offline.
- Reduces A record changed after the event; does not cover who wrote the message, or a message nobody sealed; mail written in Outlook is not gated, and what Copilot does is not seen.
- Depends on Signing keys on a separate host, held by MDSL: signed like every record, with a key MDSL holds.
- Linked from The Email Decision Record checker: reads a sealed message's record.
- Part of Email Decision Record.
-
Teams tab: seal a copy of pasted text
Layer Tier: Verified in code Status: Off by default Tools: Microsoft 365 Proposed by AI agents, not yet reviewed
Built and turned off until a Village adopts it. In the Teams tab a person pastes text and the tab builds a sealed copy with a random nonce. Only the copy's digest and size, and a digest of the chat identifier, reach the Village, which signs a pasted-text seal.
- Source
- Code: src/services/emailDecisionRecord/teamsConnector.js, line 55, at commit 36283f026e:
const SEAL_KEYS = 'contentSha256,contentSizeBytes,context,conversationSha256';
- Why this tier
- The quote is on line 55 of src/services/emailDecisionRecord/teamsConnector.js at commit 36283f026e, checked by the validator against that commit.
- What would show it wrong
- Seal pasted text in the Teams tab and read what the Village stored: if it holds the text, or the saved copy's SHA-256 differs from the signed record, the claim is wrong.
- Audit note
- Built, turned off, not yet tried in a real Microsoft 365 account: EDR_TEAMS_CONNECTOR_ENABLED is not set, and the signing host has not yet been updated for this record kind. Tested in tests/integration/emailDecisionRecordTeamsConnector.test.js. No claims register entry of its own yet.
- Linked to A record anyone can check offline: provides it for pasted text: the saved copy checks against its record.
- Reduces A record changed after the event; does not cover who wrote the text, that it appeared in Teams, or text nobody sealed.
- Depends on Signing keys on a separate host, held by MDSL: signed like every record; the signing host is not yet updated for this record kind.
- Part of Email Decision Record.
-
Seal a file: a document version sealed by its digest
Layer Tier: Verified in code Status: Off by default Tools: Microsoft 365 Proposed by AI agents, not yet reviewed
Built and turned off until a Village adopts it. A person picks a file downloaded from SharePoint or OneDrive; the browser works out its SHA-256 and only the digest and size reach the Village, which signs a document seal. It seals the copy chosen, not the original in Microsoft 365.
- Source
- Code: src/services/emailDecisionRecord/documentSeal.js, line 37, at commit 36283f026e:
const WRITTEN_SOURCES = Object.freeze(['console_file', 'teams_file']);
- Why this tier
- The quote is on line 37 of src/services/emailDecisionRecord/documentSeal.js at commit 36283f026e, checked by the validator against that commit.
- What would show it wrong
- Seal a file, then work out the SHA-256 of another copy of the same version: if it does not match the signed record, or the Village holds the file or its name, the claim is wrong.
- Audit note
- Built, turned off, not yet tried in a real Microsoft 365 account: EDR_DOCUMENT_SEAL_ENABLED is not set, and the signing host has not yet been updated for this record kind. Tested in tests/integration/emailDecisionRecordDocumentSeal.test.js. No claims register entry of its own yet. Folder watching through Microsoft Graph: not built, by design.
- Linked to A record anyone can check offline: provides it for a file: any copy of the same version checks against its record.
- Reduces A record changed after the event; does not cover who wrote the file, that it was in SharePoint or OneDrive, or a version nobody sealed; a very small text file's digest can be guessed.
- Depends on Signing keys on a separate host, held by MDSL: signed like every record; the signing host is not yet updated for this record kind.
- Linked from The Email Decision Record checker: reads a document seal.
- Part of Email Decision Record.
-
The Village
Layer Tier: Stated by us Status: Built (register VIL-01) Tools: Microsoft 365 Proposed by AI agents, not yet reviewed
A members-only platform, built and operated by MDSL in New Zealand, in which these layers sit; each Village is held separately in New Zealand or the EU.
- Source
- Claims register entry VIL-01:
Village is a members-only community and organisation platform built and operated by MDSL in New Zealand
- Why this tier
- The quote is in our claims register, entry VIL-01: our statement, not an outside check.
- What would show it wrong
- Find a Village whose records are readable from another Village: the separation claim would then be wrong.
- Audit note
- Register status live. It does not replace everything Microsoft 365 does: there is no hosted mailbox and no forms builder.
- Linked to An independent witness: provides it, from a second provider: MDSL keeps the signed record.
- Reduces Your provider is also the only witness; does not cover the second witness is MDSL, which holds the signing keys.
- Village Gateway depends on it: switched on Village by Village.
- Attested Accounts depends on it: sits inside the Business Village.
- Its parts on this map: Hash-linked records, Signing keys on a separate host, held by MDSL, A second, post-quantum signature, Held in New Zealand or the EU, by providers that are not US-owned, Export a Village's shared records.
-
Hash-linked records
Layer Tier: Stated by us Status: Built (register EST-12) Tools: Microsoft 365 Proposed by AI agents, not yet reviewed
Sealed records written from the start date in the claims register on are hash-linked, so a deleted or reordered entry in the middle of a history can be detected; older records are not.
- Source
- Claims register entry EST-12:
are hash-linked, so a deleted or reordered entry in the middle of a history can be detected
- Why this tier
- The quote is in our claims register, entry EST-12: our statement, not an outside check.
- What would show it wrong
- Delete an entry from the middle of a sealed history and run the checker: if it passes, the claim is wrong.
- Audit note
- Register status live. Earlier records are not linked after the fact, and removal of the newest entries is not yet detectable.
- Detects A record changed after the event; does not cover records from before hash-linking began, removal of the newest entries, and rewriting by the key holder.
- Part of The Village.
-
Signing keys on a separate host, held by MDSL
Layer Tier: Stated by us Status: Built (register EST-16) Tools: Microsoft 365, Outlook, Copilot Proposed by AI agents, not yet reviewed
A Village's signing key sits on a separate signing host, apart from the process that writes records, once MDSL has moved it there. MDSL operates that host and holds the keys; the organisation does not.
- Source
- Claims register entry EST-16:
Signing keys sit on a separate signing host, outside the process that writes records
- Why this tier
- The quote is in our claims register, entry EST-16: our statement, not an outside check.
- What would show it wrong
- Find a Village record signed by a key the organisation itself holds: the custody statement would then be wrong.
- Audit note
- Register status built. In the code a Village signs with a local key on MDSL's servers unless MDSL has moved it to the signing host; this map does not say which Villages have been moved. Either way MDSL holds the key, so a verified record is not protected against rewriting by MDSL.
- Linked to Know who owns the provider and holds the keys: answers it for these layers: MDSL holds the signing keys.
- Reduces A record changed after the event; does not cover MDSL itself, which holds the keys.
- Outlook add-in: seal a message and link its reply depends on it: signed like every record, with a key MDSL holds.
- Teams tab: seal a copy of pasted text depends on it: signed like every record; the signing host is not yet updated for this record kind.
- Seal a file: a document version sealed by its digest depends on it: signed like every record; the signing host is not yet updated for this record kind.
- Linked from A check never reads as verified without a pinned key: a pinned key confirms which key signed; MDSL holds it.
- Part of The Village.
-
A second, post-quantum signature
Layer Tier: Stated by us Status: Built (register EST-37) Tools: Outlook, Microsoft 365 Proposed by AI agents, not yet reviewed
A second signature, ML-DSA-65, is added after the classical one on Provenance seals, Governance API receipts, Email Decision Record receipts and compaction summaries.
- Source
- Claims register entry EST-37:
A second signature using ML-DSA-65 (NIST FIPS 204) is added to Provenance seals, Governance API receipts, Email Decision Record receipts
- Why this tier
- The quote is in our claims register, entry EST-37: our statement, not an outside check.
- What would show it wrong
- Check a recent Email Decision Record receipt from a Village where the signature is turned on: if it carries one signature only, the claim is wrong.
- Audit note
- Register status built, turned on per account. It does not cover Gateway receipts, invoices or other Village writes, and it is a hedge, not a statement that records are safe against a quantum computer.
- Reduces Locks that will not hold forever; does not cover Gateway receipts, invoices, other Village writes, and encryption of stored data.
- Part of The Village.
-
Held in New Zealand or the EU, by providers that are not US-owned
Layer Tier: Stated by us Status: Built (register VIL-02) Tools: Microsoft 365, Outlook Proposed by AI agents, not yet reviewed
Each Village's data is held in New Zealand, in Wellington, or in the EU, in Strasbourg.
- Source
- Claims register entry VIL-02:
Each Village's data is held in New Zealand (Wellington) or the EU (Strasbourg)
- Why this tier
- The quote is in our claims register, entry VIL-02: our statement, not an outside check.
- What would show it wrong
- Find a Village record stored with a US-owned provider: the claim would then be wrong.
- Audit note
- Register status live; the register's EST-07 states neither host is US-owned. It covers where records are stored, not every dependency.
- Linked to Know who owns the provider and holds the keys: answers it for these layers: New Zealand or EU hosts, not US-owned.
- Reduces Foreign law; does not cover data left in Microsoft 365, and dependencies outside record storage.
- Part of The Village.
-
Export a Village's shared records
Layer Tier: Stated by us Status: Built (register VIL-23) Tools: Microsoft 365 Proposed by AI agents, not yet reviewed
A Village owner or moderator can export the Village's shared content records, one record type at a time, through its programming interface.
- Source
- Claims register entry VIL-23:
A Village owner or moderator can export the Village's shared content records, one record type at a time
- Why this tier
- The quote is in our claims register, entry VIL-23: our statement, not an outside check.
- What would show it wrong
- Ask for an export of one record type as a Village owner: if it is refused for a Village whose records all carry a provenance hash, the claim is wrong.
- Audit note
- Register status live. There is no screen for it, and a record type is refused whole if any record lacks a provenance hash.
- Reduces A provider you cannot leave; does not cover files and mail kept in Microsoft 365; there is no screen for the export.
- Part of The Village.
-
Attested Accounts
Layer Tier: Stated by us Status: Available by arrangement (register ACC-01) Tools: Microsoft 365 Proposed by AI agents, not yet reviewed
An evidence layer over the Business Village's invoicing, quotes, recurring invoices, expenses and time tracking: each write is signed as it is made.
- Source
- Claims register entry ACC-01:
Attested Accounts is an evidence layer over the Business Village's invoicing, quoting, recurring invoicing, expense and time tracking.
- Why this tier
- The quote is in our claims register, entry ACC-01: our statement, not an outside check.
- What would show it wrong
- Find a write to an invoice that left no signed entry: the claim would then be wrong.
- Audit note
- Register status available on request. It is not an accounting system and does not say whether figures are right.
- Linked to A record anyone can check offline: provides it for invoices.
- Detects A record changed after the event; does not cover whether the figures are right; quotes, expenses and time entries have no bundle yet.
- Depends on The Village: sits inside the Business Village.
- Linked from An invoice's offline verification bundle: checks an invoice's history.
-
Provenance
Layer Tier: Documented on a product page Status: Available by arrangement (register PRV-02) Tools: Microsoft 365 Proposed by AI agents, not yet reviewed
Each party in an export chain signs its own records of a lot and passes them on with the lot, so the last holder's file shows every party back to the first.
- Source
- Product page /provenance-product.html, at commit 90b235706c:
Each party in an export chain, from grower to processor, exporter and buyer, signs its own records of a lot
- Why this tier
- The quote is on /provenance-product.html at commit 90b235706c, a page whose claims have been corrected against the register and the code.
- What would show it wrong
- Find a Provenance dossier in which a substituted record passes the check: the claim would then be wrong.
- Audit note
- Register status available on request. It is about goods in a supply chain, not about mail or files.
- Linked to A record anyone can check offline: provides it: a buyer checks in a browser.
- Detects A record changed after the event; does not cover whether what a party recorded is true.
- Linked from The Provenance check in a browser: checks a lot's chain.
-
-
Evidence: how you can check (9)
-
The Gateway checking program
Evidence Tier: Documented on a product page Tools: Copilot Proposed by AI agents, not yet reviewed
An exported Gateway decision can be checked by whoever holds it, with the Village's trust bundle and Node 20, with no account and no network.
- Source
- Product page /gateway.html, at commit 90b235706c:
Anyone you give the record to can check it with the checking program, using the trust bundle the Village supplies and Node 20 or newer. It needs no account and no network.
- Why this tier
- The quote is on /gateway.html at commit 90b235706c, a page whose claims have been corrected against the register and the code.
- What would show it wrong
- Run the checking program on an export with one byte changed: if it reports verified, the claim is wrong.
- Audit note
- The program is served at mysovereignty.digital/downloads/ with its SHA-256. Run on the synthetic sample it exits 1 by design, because the sample's receipt has no stamp.
- Linked to Village Gateway: checks an exported decision.
- Linked from Each checking program published with its SHA-256: confirms the program run is the one published.
-
Each checking program published with its SHA-256
Evidence Tier: Stated by us Tools: Microsoft 365, Outlook, Copilot Proposed by AI agents, not yet reviewed
Each offline checking program is published with its SHA-256, so a reader can confirm the file they run is the file MDSL published.
- Source
- Claims register entry EST-38:
Each offline checking program is published at mysovereignty.digital/downloads/ with its SHA-256
- Why this tier
- The quote is in our claims register, entry EST-38: our statement, not an outside check.
- What would show it wrong
- Download a checking program and its .sha256 file and compare: a mismatch would show the claim wrong.
- Audit note
- Register status built. Publication for reading and checking is not an offer of any product.
- Linked to The Gateway checking program: confirms the program run is the one published.
-
The Conduct Record offline check
Evidence Tier: Documented on a product page Tools: Copilot Proposed by AI agents, not yet reviewed
An auditor can check a Conduct Record offline, without an MDSL account.
- Source
- Product page /mio-conduct-record.html, at commit 90b235706c:
An auditor can check a Conduct Record offline, without an MDSL account.
- Why this tier
- The quote is on /mio-conduct-record.html at commit 90b235706c, a page whose claims have been corrected against the register and the code.
- What would show it wrong
- Check a Conduct Record with the network off and no account: if the check cannot run, the claim is wrong.
- Audit note
- The page says the order in which mandates were recorded is not yet tamper-evident; the lookup says so with each answer.
- Linked to MIO° Conduct Record: checks a Conduct Record.
-
The Email Decision Record checker
Evidence Tier: Documented on a product page Tools: Outlook, Microsoft 365 Proposed by AI agents, not yet reviewed
A standalone checker verifies an Email Decision Record in a browser or from a file, with no account and no call to MDSL.
- Source
- Product page /email-decision-record-product.html, at commit 90b235706c:
A standalone checker verifies a record in a browser or from a file, with no account and no call to us.
- Why this tier
- The quote is on /email-decision-record-product.html at commit 90b235706c, a page whose claims have been corrected against the register and the code.
- What would show it wrong
- Remove a receipt from inside a chain in a dossier and run the checker: if it does not report a gap, the claim is wrong.
- Audit note
- The checker returns a plain result for each record and says what it could not check.
- Linked to Email Decision Record: checks a dossier.
- Linked to Outlook add-in: seal a message and link its reply: reads a sealed message's record.
- Linked to Seal a file: a document version sealed by its digest: reads a document seal.
-
Check one suspicious email
Evidence Tier: Stated by us Tools: Outlook Proposed by AI agents, not yet reviewed
An email saved from Outlook as .eml can be uploaded for nine checks on the message itself, with no account.
- Source
- The guide, Stepping outside the ring:
Save it from Outlook as .eml and upload it at mysovereignty.digital/scam-check.html. No account is needed. Nine checks run on the message itself
- Why this tier
- The quote is in our guide, Stepping outside the ring: our statement, not an outside check.
- What would show it wrong
- Upload a message with a lookalike sender domain: if no check flags it, the claim is wrong.
- Audit note
- A tenth check, link reputation, is shown as not checked. It looks at one message; it does not watch a mailbox.
- Detects Messages that sound like someone you know; does not cover voice and video, and link reputation, which is shown as not checked.
-
A check never reads as verified without a pinned key
Evidence Tier: Documented on a product page Tools: Microsoft 365, Outlook, Copilot Proposed by AI agents, not yet reviewed
Without a pinned key, the checker reports a record as valid under a key the record supplied, never as verified, because a record with swapped keys would otherwise pass.
- Source
- Product page /evidence.html, at commit 90b235706c:
It never reads as verified, because a record whose keys had been swapped would otherwise pass.
- Why this tier
- The quote is on /evidence.html at commit 90b235706c, a page whose claims have been corrected against the register and the code.
- What would show it wrong
- Run a checker on a record with no key pinned: if it reports verified, the claim is wrong.
- Audit note
- Pinning a key confirms which key signed; MDSL holds the signing keys today.
- Linked to Signing keys on a separate host, held by MDSL: a pinned key confirms which key signed; MDSL holds it.
-
What a check cannot show
Evidence Tier: Stated by us Tools: Microsoft 365, Outlook, Copilot Proposed by AI agents, not yet reviewed
A check shows that a record is unchanged since it was signed, and when. The signature says nothing about whether the content was true.
- Source
- The guide, Stepping outside the ring:
The signature says nothing about whether the content was true.
- Why this tier
- The quote is in our guide, Stepping outside the ring: our statement, not an outside check.
- What would show it wrong
- Find a page of ours that presents a passed check as proof that a record's content is true: that page would contradict this node.
- Audit note
- The limit that applies to every checker on this map.
- Linked to A record anyone can check offline: the limit of every check: unchanged since signing, not true.
-
An invoice's offline verification bundle
Evidence Tier: Documented on a product page Tools: Microsoft 365 Proposed by AI agents, not yet reviewed
An invoice has an action-history view and a downloadable bundle that a third party can check offline, without a Village account.
- Source
- Product page /attested-accounts.html, at commit 90b235706c:
An invoice has an action-history view and a downloadable verification bundle that a third party can check offline, without a Village account.
- Why this tier
- The quote is on /attested-accounts.html at commit 90b235706c, a page whose claims have been corrected against the register and the code.
- What would show it wrong
- Change one figure in an invoice bundle and check it offline: if it passes, the claim is wrong.
- Audit note
- Invoices only: quotes, expenses and time entries do not yet have a history view or bundle.
- Linked to Attested Accounts: checks an invoice's history.
-
The Provenance check in a browser
Evidence Tier: Documented on a product page Tools: Microsoft 365 Proposed by AI agents, not yet reviewed
A buyer checks every party's records in a browser, on its own machine, with no account and no connection to MDSL.
- Source
- Product page /provenance-product.html, at commit 90b235706c:
A buyer checks every party's records in a browser, on its own machine, with no account and no connection to us.
- Why this tier
- The quote is on /provenance-product.html at commit 90b235706c, a page whose claims have been corrected against the register and the code.
- What would show it wrong
- Open a dossier with the network off: if the check needs a connection, the claim is wrong.
- Audit note
- It does not show that what a party recorded is true.
- Linked to Provenance: checks a lot's chain.
-
The map by view
By tier
Verified in code (6)
- The requester cannot approve its own request
- Permits run out
- Sending through a Microsoft account with send-only permission
- Outlook add-in: seal a message and link its reply
- Teams tab: seal a copy of pasted text
- Seal a file: a document version sealed by its digest
Documented on a product page (22)
- AI agents that overstep
- Messages that sound like someone you know
- Confident AI mistakes
- Unfair automated decisions
- A record changed after the event
- Foreign law
- Locks that will not hold forever
- Leaked passwords and member details
- Pictures you cannot vouch for
- A written mandate for each agent
- A different person approves
- A record anyone can check offline
- Know who owns the provider and holds the keys
- Email Decision Record
- Provenance
- Four eyes on an agent's email
- The Gateway checking program
- The Conduct Record offline check
- The Email Decision Record checker
- A check never reads as verified without a pinned key
- An invoice's offline verification bundle
- The Provenance check in a browser
Stated by us (21)
- An email sent by an agent nobody approved
- Your provider is also the only witness
- A provider you cannot leave
- Permission that runs out
- An independent witness
- Village Gateway
- MIO° Conduct Record
- The Village
- Attested Accounts
- Stop every Gateway decision at once
- A spending limit for each agent
- An outside clock on each Gateway receipt
- Checking an action against the mandate in force
- Hash-linked records
- Signing keys on a separate host, held by MDSL
- A second, post-quantum signature
- Held in New Zealand or the EU, by providers that are not US-owned
- Export a Village's shared records
- Each checking program published with its SHA-256
- Check one suspicious email
- What a check cannot show
Open: no source (2)
By layer
Village Gateway (18)
- AI agents that overstep
- Messages that sound like someone you know
- Unfair automated decisions
- Your provider is also the only witness
- A different person approves
- Permission that runs out
- An independent witness
- A record anyone can check offline
- Village Gateway
- A Copilot connector to Village Gateway
- The Village
- The requester cannot approve its own request
- Permits run out
- Stop every Gateway decision at once
- A spending limit for each agent
- An outside clock on each Gateway receipt
- Checking an action against the mandate in force
- The Gateway checking program
MIO° Conduct Record (7)
- AI agents that overstep
- A written mandate for each agent
- A record anyone can check offline
- Village Gateway
- MIO° Conduct Record
- Checking an action against the mandate in force
- The Conduct Record offline check
Email Decision Record (15)
- An email sent by an agent nobody approved
- Messages that sound like someone you know
- Confident AI mistakes
- A record changed after the event
- A different person approves
- A record anyone can check offline
- Email Decision Record
- Reading a Microsoft 365 mailbox through Microsoft sign-in
- Four eyes on an agent's email
- Sending through a Microsoft account with send-only permission
- Outlook add-in: seal a message and link its reply
- Teams tab: seal a copy of pasted text
- Seal a file: a document version sealed by its digest
- Signing keys on a separate host, held by MDSL
- The Email Decision Record checker
The Village (19)
- A record changed after the event
- Your provider is also the only witness
- Foreign law
- A provider you cannot leave
- Locks that will not hold forever
- An independent witness
- Know who owns the provider and holds the keys
- Village Gateway
- The Village
- Attested Accounts
- Outlook add-in: seal a message and link its reply
- Teams tab: seal a copy of pasted text
- Seal a file: a document version sealed by its digest
- Hash-linked records
- Signing keys on a separate host, held by MDSL
- A second, post-quantum signature
- Held in New Zealand or the EU, by providers that are not US-owned
- Export a Village's shared records
- A check never reads as verified without a pinned key
Attested Accounts (5)
- A record changed after the event
- A record anyone can check offline
- The Village
- Attested Accounts
- An invoice's offline verification bundle
Provenance (4)
By threat
AI agents that overstep (13)
- AI agents that overstep
- A written mandate for each agent
- A different person approves
- Permission that runs out
- Village Gateway
- A Copilot connector to Village Gateway
- MIO° Conduct Record
- Permits run out
- Stop every Gateway decision at once
- A spending limit for each agent
- Checking an action against the mandate in force
- The Gateway checking program
- The Conduct Record offline check
An email sent by an agent nobody approved (6)
- An email sent by an agent nobody approved
- A different person approves
- Email Decision Record
- Four eyes on an agent's email
- Sending through a Microsoft account with send-only permission
- The Email Decision Record checker
Messages that sound like someone you know (8)
- Messages that sound like someone you know
- A different person approves
- Village Gateway
- Email Decision Record
- Reading a Microsoft 365 mailbox through Microsoft sign-in
- The Gateway checking program
- The Email Decision Record checker
- Check one suspicious email
Confident AI mistakes (4)
- Confident AI mistakes
- A different person approves
- Email Decision Record
- The Email Decision Record checker
Unfair automated decisions (3)
A record changed after the event (16)
- A record changed after the event
- An independent witness
- A record anyone can check offline
- Email Decision Record
- The Village
- Attested Accounts
- Provenance
- Outlook add-in: seal a message and link its reply
- Teams tab: seal a copy of pasted text
- Seal a file: a document version sealed by its digest
- Hash-linked records
- Signing keys on a separate host, held by MDSL
- The Email Decision Record checker
- A check never reads as verified without a pinned key
- An invoice's offline verification bundle
- The Provenance check in a browser
Your provider is also the only witness (6)
- Your provider is also the only witness
- An independent witness
- Village Gateway
- The Village
- An outside clock on each Gateway receipt
- The Gateway checking program
Foreign law (4)
- Foreign law
- Know who owns the provider and holds the keys
- The Village
- Held in New Zealand or the EU, by providers that are not US-owned
A provider you cannot leave (4)
- A provider you cannot leave
- Know who owns the provider and holds the keys
- The Village
- Export a Village's shared records
Locks that will not hold forever (5)
- Locks that will not hold forever
- A record anyone can check offline
- Know who owns the provider and holds the keys
- The Village
- A second, post-quantum signature
Leaked passwords and member details (1)
Pictures you cannot vouch for (1)
By tool
Microsoft 365 (38)
- AI agents that overstep
- An email sent by an agent nobody approved
- Messages that sound like someone you know
- Unfair automated decisions
- A record changed after the event
- Your provider is also the only witness
- Foreign law
- A provider you cannot leave
- Locks that will not hold forever
- Leaked passwords and member details
- Pictures you cannot vouch for
- A written mandate for each agent
- A different person approves
- An independent witness
- A record anyone can check offline
- Know who owns the provider and holds the keys
- Village Gateway
- MIO° Conduct Record
- Email Decision Record
- Reading a Microsoft 365 mailbox through Microsoft sign-in
- The Village
- Attested Accounts
- Provenance
- Sending through a Microsoft account with send-only permission
- Outlook add-in: seal a message and link its reply
- Teams tab: seal a copy of pasted text
- Seal a file: a document version sealed by its digest
- Hash-linked records
- Signing keys on a separate host, held by MDSL
- A second, post-quantum signature
- Held in New Zealand or the EU, by providers that are not US-owned
- Export a Village's shared records
- Each checking program published with its SHA-256
- The Email Decision Record checker
- A check never reads as verified without a pinned key
- What a check cannot show
- An invoice's offline verification bundle
- The Provenance check in a browser
Copilot (29)
- AI agents that overstep
- An email sent by an agent nobody approved
- Confident AI mistakes
- Unfair automated decisions
- Your provider is also the only witness
- Foreign law
- Pictures you cannot vouch for
- A written mandate for each agent
- A different person approves
- Permission that runs out
- An independent witness
- Know who owns the provider and holds the keys
- Village Gateway
- A Copilot connector to Village Gateway
- MIO° Conduct Record
- Email Decision Record
- The requester cannot approve its own request
- Permits run out
- Stop every Gateway decision at once
- A spending limit for each agent
- An outside clock on each Gateway receipt
- Checking an action against the mandate in force
- Four eyes on an agent's email
- Signing keys on a separate host, held by MDSL
- The Gateway checking program
- Each checking program published with its SHA-256
- The Conduct Record offline check
- A check never reads as verified without a pinned key
- What a check cannot show
Outlook (26)
- AI agents that overstep
- An email sent by an agent nobody approved
- Messages that sound like someone you know
- Confident AI mistakes
- Your provider is also the only witness
- Foreign law
- A provider you cannot leave
- Locks that will not hold forever
- Leaked passwords and member details
- A different person approves
- An independent witness
- A record anyone can check offline
- Know who owns the provider and holds the keys
- Email Decision Record
- Reading a Microsoft 365 mailbox through Microsoft sign-in
- Four eyes on an agent's email
- Sending through a Microsoft account with send-only permission
- Outlook add-in: seal a message and link its reply
- Signing keys on a separate host, held by MDSL
- A second, post-quantum signature
- Held in New Zealand or the EU, by providers that are not US-owned
- Each checking program published with its SHA-256
- The Email Decision Record checker
- Check one suspicious email
- A check never reads as verified without a pinned key
- What a check cannot show
Open claims only
Gaps: not built, or no answer on this map (5)
Claims with a limit
Claims on a link that says what it does not cover (37)
- AI agents that overstep
- An email sent by an agent nobody approved
- Messages that sound like someone you know
- Confident AI mistakes
- A record changed after the event
- Your provider is also the only witness
- Foreign law
- A provider you cannot leave
- Locks that will not hold forever
- A written mandate for each agent
- A different person approves
- Permission that runs out
- An independent witness
- A record anyone can check offline
- Know who owns the provider and holds the keys
- Village Gateway
- MIO° Conduct Record
- Email Decision Record
- The Village
- Attested Accounts
- Provenance
- Permits run out
- Stop every Gateway decision at once
- A spending limit for each agent
- An outside clock on each Gateway receipt
- Checking an action against the mandate in force
- Four eyes on an agent's email
- Sending through a Microsoft account with send-only permission
- Outlook add-in: seal a message and link its reply
- Teams tab: seal a copy of pasted text
- Seal a file: a document version sealed by its digest
- Hash-linked records
- Signing keys on a separate host, held by MDSL
- A second, post-quantum signature
- Held in New Zealand or the EU, by providers that are not US-owned
- Export a Village's shared records
- Check one suspicious email
Recently changed
Changed in the latest version (10 November 2026) (51)
- AI agents that overstep
- An email sent by an agent nobody approved
- Messages that sound like someone you know
- Confident AI mistakes
- Unfair automated decisions
- A record changed after the event
- Your provider is also the only witness
- Foreign law
- A provider you cannot leave
- Locks that will not hold forever
- Leaked passwords and member details
- Pictures you cannot vouch for
- A written mandate for each agent
- A different person approves
- Permission that runs out
- An independent witness
- A record anyone can check offline
- Know who owns the provider and holds the keys
- Village Gateway
- A Copilot connector to Village Gateway
- MIO° Conduct Record
- Email Decision Record
- Reading a Microsoft 365 mailbox through Microsoft sign-in
- The Village
- Attested Accounts
- Provenance
- The requester cannot approve its own request
- Permits run out
- Stop every Gateway decision at once
- A spending limit for each agent
- An outside clock on each Gateway receipt
- Checking an action against the mandate in force
- Four eyes on an agent's email
- Sending through a Microsoft account with send-only permission
- Outlook add-in: seal a message and link its reply
- Teams tab: seal a copy of pasted text
- Seal a file: a document version sealed by its digest
- Hash-linked records
- Signing keys on a separate host, held by MDSL
- A second, post-quantum signature
- Held in New Zealand or the EU, by providers that are not US-owned
- Export a Village's shared records
- The Gateway checking program
- Each checking program published with its SHA-256
- The Conduct Record offline check
- The Email Decision Record checker
- Check one suspicious email
- A check never reads as verified without a pinned key
- What a check cannot show
- An invoice's offline verification bundle
- The Provenance check in a browser